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In the Doha Round of trade negotiations, it has been acknowledged that agriculture has a 
special role to play in developing countries and non-trade concerns like food security, 
livelihood security and issues related to rural development should be given priority over trade 
liberalization. To enable developing countries take account of their developmental needs, two 
new defensive instruments have been proposed in the current round of negotiations on 
agriculture. First, it has been decided that developing countries will have the flexibility to 
designate an appropriate number of products as Special Products (SP) which will be eligible 
for more flexible market access commitments. Second, to temporarily protect the domestic 
agriculture of developing countries from international commodity price volatility and import 
surges, a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) will be made available to these countries.  
Both SP and SSM are new defensive instruments made available to developing countries in 
the Doha Round of trade talks and it will be important to analyze how these mechanisms are 
going to help developing countries in their pursuit to protect the livelihood and food security 
of their farmers. This paper focuses on the SSM and analyzes its implications for developing 
countries. It also puts forth specific suggestions regarding design and implementation of a 
price-trigger-based special safeguard mechanism.  
It is hoped that the working paper will help policy-makers and stakeholders to take a view on 
this important issue. We are very grateful to the Sir Ratan Tata Trust for funding this and 
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In the Doha Round of negotiations on agriculture it has been decided that all developing and 
least developed Member countries of the WTO will have access to a Special Safeguard 
Mechanism (SSM). This means that developing countries will now have the option to 
temporarily impose higher tariff rates on the import of an agricultural product if there is either 
a surge in its import volumes or a sharp dip in its import prices. However, the exact 
mechanisms of the implementation of SSMs have not been spelt out. It is also not clear what 
legal provisions the Member countries will have to follow to use this safeguard mechanism.  
 
This paper takes a detailed look at the SSM and analyzes its usefulness for developing 
countries. It also explores how the concept of a special agricultural safeguard has evolved in 
the present round of negotiations and what are the country positions on SSMs in the Doha 
Round. The paper then proposes a price-trigger-based SSM instrument which is consistent 
with the goals spelt out in the Doha Development Agenda and satisfies most of the desired 
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I  INTRODUCTION 
During the Uruguay Round it was expected that the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) 
would bring about a structural change in global agricultural trade and more efficient 
agricultural producers would stand to benefit from the WTO agreement. As many developing 
countries are low-cost producers of agricultural goods, it was expected that these countries 
would significantly benefit from a more open and less distorted global agricultural trade 
regime. 
 
However, the implementation experience of the AoA shows that though it has succeeded in 
reducing the widespread use of quantitative restrictions (QRs) in agricultural trade, agriculture 
still remains a distorted sector. Some large developed countries have managed to bypass the 
WTO rules regarding subsidy reduction. Using some loopholes in the agreement, these 
countries have retained the overall level of subsidy given to their farm sector. Some countries 
have also devised ways to comply with the rules of the AoA and still maintain a fairly high 
level of import restrictions. As a result, the gains for developing countries from agricultural 
trade liberalization have been less than expected. On the flip side, the opening up of their 
agriculture sector to international trade has made the farming community of the developing 
countries vulnerable as they are now facing problems protecting their domestic markets from 
the cheap and subsidized exports of the developed countries. Trade liberalization and removal 
of non-tariff barriers have also exposed the domestic markets of the developing countries to 
the volatility of international commodity prices. 
Given the importance of agriculture in developing countries and the prevalent distortions in 
international farm trade, it was realized that to enable these countries to tackle their non-trade 
concerns some defense mechanisms should be made available to them. Consequently, it has 
been decided in this round of negotiations that
1:  
a)  For developing countries, non-trade concerns like food security, livelihood security 
and issues related to rural development should be given priority over trade 
liberalization.  
b)  Developing-country Members should be allowed to maintain an appropriate level of 
tariff protection for some agricultural commodities--including some key staple 
foods—since exposing farmers to the artificially cheap exports of developed countries 
can have disastrous consequences for domestic agriculture In the Doha Round of 
                                                      
1  See the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the July Framework and the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration.    7
trade talks, it has been decided that developing countries will have the flexibility to 
designate an appropriate number of products as ‘Special Products’ (SP), which will 
be eligible for more flexible treatment. The SPs will be chosen by the developing 
countries themselves (self-designation) based on the relevance of these products to 
food security, livelihood security and rural development. 
c)   A special safeguard mechanism (SSM) will be made available to developing and 
least developed countries to temporarily protect their domestic agriculture from 
international commodity price volatility and import surges.  
Both the SP and the SSM are new defense instruments made available to developing countries 
in the Doha Round of trade talks and it is important to analyze how these mechanisms are 
going to help these countries in their pursuit to protect the livelihood and food security of 
their farmers.  
 
The SSM is a set of WTO provisions through which a WTO Member country can temporarily 
impose a tariff rate that is higher than the bound tariff rate on the import of a particular 
product. The idea behind such a safeguard instrument is that it should allow a country to use 
temporary protective measures to insulate its domestic economies from the short-term 
fluctuations of international prices. Consequently, these safeguard mechanisms are also 
temporary and short-term and are not meant to insulate a country from the price signals 
emanating from long-run or secular movements of commodity prices.  
 
The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration has announced that in the Doha Development Round 
such a provision will be made available to all developing and least developed countries that 
are members of WTO. Paragraph 7 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration states: 
‘Developing country Members will also have the right to have recourse to a Special 
Safeguard Mechanism based on import quantity and price triggers, with precise 
arrangements to be further defined.  Special Products and the Special Safeguard Mechanism 
shall be an integral part of the modalities and the outcome of negotiations in agriculture.’ 
 
This implies that, according to the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, a WTO Member 
country will have the right to impose SSMs if it finds that imports are increasing to the extent 
that local markets are being disrupted or threatened (a ‘volume trigger’ in WTO jargon) or if 
there is a collapse of the international price of that commodity which undermines or threatens   8
to undermine the otherwise viable domestic production (a ‘price trigger’)
2. It has been decided 
in the WTO negotiations that the SSM will be provided as a part of ‘Special and Differential 
Treatment’ (S&D) which means that is, it will only be available to the developing and the 
least developed countries of the WTO
3. The developed-country Members will not have access 
to this instrument. 
 
It is important to mention here that in the Uruguay Round AoA a similar safeguard 
mechanism was available to a select group of countries. This safeguard instrument was called 
the ‘Special Safeguards’ (SSG)
4 and it was available to countries which went for the 
tariffication/Tariff-Rate Quota (TRQ) route in the market access negotiations of the Uruguay 
Round. Currently, 39 out of the 149 WTO Members have access to SSG. As most developing 
countries, including India, took the ceiling binding approach (or the bound tariff route) in the 
AoA, the SSG mechanisms were not available to them. 
 
The Ministerial Declaration shows that though the provisions of an SSM have been 
announced, the exact mechanisms of the implementation of the SSMs have not been spelt out. 
For example, price and volume triggers have not been defined. It has not been decided what 
kind of temporary market access barriers can be erected to insulate a country from import 
surges and price volatility. It is also not clear what legal provisions the Member countries will 
have to follow to use this safeguard mechanism.  
 
Against this backdrop, this paper takes a detailed look at the SSM and analyzes its usefulness 
for developing countries. The paper also explores how the concept of a special agricultural 
safeguard has evolved in the present round of negotiations and what are the country positions 
on SSMs in the Doha Round. The paper then proposes a price-trigger-based SSM instrument 
which, the authors believe, satisfies most of the desirable features of a safeguard instrument. 
 
                                                      
2  These definitions are from Sharma (2005) who defines import surges as: ‘…the term “import surge” 
is used in a general sense to indicate the two external shocks mentioned in the AoA. One is the 
phenomenon of volume surge – for whatever reason, a country finds that imports are increasing to 
the extent that local markets are disrupted or are threatened. The other is depressed import prices, 
mostly due to movements in world market prices, which undermine or threaten to undermine 
otherwise viable domestic production.’ Page 1.  
Also see Mosoti and Sharma (2005) for a more detailed discussion on various concepts related to 
import surges. 
3  In this paper, henceforth, when we are mentioning ‘developing countries’ we imply ‘developing and 
least developed countries’. 
4  Article 5 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture.   9
The paper is structured in the following manner. In Section II the authors seek to analyze why 
developing countries are dissatisfied with the existing agricultural safeguard mechanisms and 
why they are demanding a new and more widely available SSM. In Section III the authors 
explore how the concept of a new special safeguard has evolved in the present round of 
negotiations and analyze different country positions. In Section IV, they discuss some 
important operational issues regarding the SSM. Based on these discussions, a model for a 
price-trigger-based SSM is proposed in Section V. In Section VI the possible implementation 
issues regarding the use of an SSM in a developing country are discussed. Section VI 
concludes the study.   
 
II  WHY DO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES NEED A NEW SAFEGUARD 
MECHANISM? 
 
In the current round of negotiations, many WTO Member countries have argued that a new 
and more widely available safeguard instrument should be made available to all developing 
and least developed countries. The main justification behind this argument was the fact that 
international commodity prices have remained extremely volatile during the WTO 
implementation period. Given this high volatility, it has been argued that a temporary 
safeguard measure, in the mould of an SSG, is likely to prove effective for insulating the 
domestic economy of a Member country from temporary gyrations of international 
commodity prices.  
 
Developing countries are also worried because the ambitious tariff reduction proposals put 
forward in the present round of trade talks will reduce the ability of these countries to protect 
their domestic agriculture using bound tariff rates. During the Uruguay Round negotiations 
this concern was not paramount because at that time the general perception was that 
liberalization of agricultural trade would raise international commodity prices and that 
developing countries, as low-cost producers of agricultural goods, would emerge as viable 
exporters of these items. Also, in the Uruguay Round, developing countries were confident 
that trade liberalization and the resultant high prices of agricultural goods coupled with the 
high bound tariff rates would allow these countries to maintain sufficient gap between bound 
and applied tariff rates which, in turn, would allow these countries to counter the price 
volatility in the international market. Due to this reason, most developing countries did not 
opt for the SSG option in the Uruguay Round. However, as things turned out, the continued 
support and subsidy policy of the developed countries kept the world prices volatile and low.   10
This has created serious problems for agricultural producers in developing countries. Low and 
volatile commodity prices have resulted in import surges in many developing countries. Since 
farmers in developing countries are poor and have a low risk-taking ability, import surges can 
have serious consequences on the livelihood security of these farmers. Given these reasons, 
most developing countries have expressed concern about the non-trade issues associated with 
agriculture and have opined that unless a special safeguard mechanism is allowed for these 
countries, it will be difficult for them to participate in further tariff liberalization. This 
concern is evident in India’s submission to the WTO where it says:  
‘Given the volatility of agricultural commodity markets and the inability of farmers in 
developing countries to bear risks arising out of violent fluctuations in international prices, 
an effective safeguard mechanism for preventing a surge in imports becomes absolutely 
essential for preserving the livelihood of farmers.’ (WTO Document Number G/AG/NG/102) 
 
II.1.1  Imbalance of the Existing Safeguard Mechanisms 
 
International commodity prices have always been volatile and the need for a safeguard 
measure to protect countries from this volatility has long been recognized. As mentioned 
earlier, the provision of a special safeguard to allow countries impose temporary market 
access barriers already existed in the Uruguay Round AoA. But this provision was not 
available to all WTO Members. To understand why this was so it is important to review the 
market access component of the Uruguay Round AoA. 
 
One of the main objectives of the AoA was improving market access by removing non-tariff 
barriers and lowering tariff rates on agricultural products. To attain this goal, the AoA 
prohibited the use of Non Tariff Barriers (NTBs) for agricultural products. As a first step, the 
AoA stipulated that all NTBs on the import of an agricultural product would have to be 
replaced by a single ‘bound’ tariff rate in a way that the resulting protection would be less 
than or equivalent to the nominal protection in the base period. This process was called 
‘tariffication’. Nominal protection was measured by calculating the difference between 
domestic prices and international prices for the reference period, 1986-90. ‘Bound’ rate 
implied that the base period tariff rates were to act as ceiling rates. No country was allowed to 
increase tariff rates beyond the bound rate. The AoA then stipulated that the average ‘bound’   11
tariff rate of agricultural products would have to be reduced over a period of time with a 
minimum cut on the tariff rate of each product
5.  
 
In the AoA, along with the ‘tariffication’ method, developing countries were given an 
additional option for converting their market access barriers to tariff. According to this option, 
for fixation of tariff rates on agricultural items, developing countries could declare a ‘bound 
tariff rate’ they thought would be appropriate for the concerned product. The advantage of 
this approach was that the ‘bound tariff rate’ was not based on the calculation of tariff 
equivalents but was an arbitrary rate with which the developing country felt comfortable
6. 
This approach was called the ‘bound rate’ approach.   
Table 1.gives a more detailed picture of the methods used for determining tariff bindings in 
the Uruguay Round AoA. 
 
Table 1. Methods  used  for  Determining   Tariff   Bindings   in   the   Uruguay    Round 
 Agreement on Agriculture 
 
Country Status  Binding Status  Method for determining tariff bindings for 
reduction purpose 
Developed  Previously bound  If no NTB, use current bound rate 
 




If no NTB, use the rate applied in September 1986 
 




Previously bound  If no NTB, same as for a developed country  
 
If NTB, same as for a developed country 
 Previously 
unbound 
If no NTB, same as for a developed country or offer 
ceiling binding 
 
If NTB, same as for a developed country or offer 
ceiling binding 
Note: NTB stands for Non-Tariff Barriers 
In the AoA, the SSG provisions were only offered to countries that converted their market 
access barriers into tariffs using the tariffication option. The countries which took the ‘bound 
rate approach’ were not privy to the SSG instrument. The argument behind this dichotomous 
treatment was that when a country opted for the ‘bound rate approach’ and declared a certain 
                                                      
5  For developed countries, it was 36 per cent average cut with 15 per cent minimum cut; for 
developing countries the corresponding figures were 24 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively. The 
implementation period for developed countries was 1995-2000; for developing countries it was 
1995-2004. 
6  India, for example, offered bound tariff rates of 100, 150 and 300 percent for agricultural goods in 
the Uruguay Round AoA.   12
bound tariff rate, it had the flexibility to factor in a safety margin over and above the tariff 
rate deemed sufficient to protect the concerned product. Therefore, the ‘bound rate approach’ 
already had a certain amount of flexibility built into it and it was felt that an additional SSG 
instrument would not be required for these countries. To support this argument, it is often 
pointed out that there are large gaps between the bound rates and applied tariff rates
7 for 
agricultural products in most developing countries. For example, India’s average bound rate 
for agricultural products is more than 100 per cent whereas the average applied tariff rate is 
around 35 per cent. Presently, among the 149 WTO Members, only 39 have the right to use 
the SSG and, out of these 39 countries, 22 are developing countries (see Table 2. List of 
Countries which have Access to SSG Table 3).  
Table 2. List  of  Countries  which  have  Access  to SSG  
These 39 WTO Members reserve the right to apply SSG on 6,156 tariff lines while the 22 
developing countries among them have the right to use SSG on 2,125 tariff lines. 
 
Table 2. List  of  Countries  which  have  Access  to SSG  
(The numbers in brackets show number of tariff items for which the right to take recourse to 








Costa Rica (87) 
Czech Republic (236) 
Ecuador (7) 




















Slovak Republic (114) 
South Africa (166) 
Swaziland (166) 
Switzerland-Liechtenstein (961)
Chinese Taipei (84) 
Thailand (52) 
Tunisia (32) 
United States (189) 
Uruguay (2) 
Venezuela (76) 
Source: Special Agricultural Safeguard, background paper by the Secretariat, WTO 
Document Number G/AG/NG/S/9/Rev.119, dated February 2002. 
 
Implementation experience of the Uruguay Round AoA shows that the existing SSG 
mechanism did not prove useful to developing countries. There are broadly two reasons 
behind this. First, and the most obvious reason, is that the SSG was not available to a large 
majority of the developing countries. Second, even when the SSG was available, the usage of 
                                                      
7 See  Figure 7. . Applied rates are the tariff rates that are actually charged or imposed on the imports.   13
this instrument was quite limited. Data show that among the 22 developing countries which 
had the right to invoke SSGs, only six have actually used it during the period 1994-2004
8. 
These countries have triggered the SSG only 163 times over the period 1995-2004. FAO 
(2004) has calculated that the overall ‘SSG utilization rate’--the ratio of actual use to potential 
use–is about 1 per cent when the potential uses by all 22 developing countries are taken into 
account. The paper by the FAO shows that even in cases where there were import surges 
based on depressed import prices, many developing countries did not impose the SSG 
measures. It has been hypothesized that the low utilization of SSG may stem from the fact 
that governments used these safeguards with restraint because application of an SSG can be 
cumbersome
9 or can involve significant administrative cost. This is understandable because 
most developing countries lack resources to track and monitor import volumes in real time 
and if a country has multiple ports or trading points then this issue becomes even more 
complex. Therefore, most developing countries found it extremely difficult to monitor and 
satisfy the volume trigger criteria laid out in the Uruguay Round AoA. Price-based SSGs are 
much easier to monitor and invoke but most developing countries had not exercised this 
option during the implementation period. The other possible reason for the limited use of SSG 
could be that although import prices fell or/and imports surged, the authorities may have 
determined that this would not lead to injury of the domestic economy and so might not have 
felt the need for a response. Another possible reason why SSGs were not used much could be 
the fact that the level of the bound tariffs was high enough for countries to raise the applied 
rates to an appropriate level to offset the effects of depressed import prices.  
 
On the other hand, the users of SSG have predominantly been the developed countries 
(Figures 1 and 2)
10. These figures show that for the period 1995-2001,  apart from a couple of 
countries like Costa Rica and Slovak Republic, almost all the users of SSG belonged to the 
OECD group of countries
11. In a statement to the WTO, India has pointed out that OECD 
countries have made liberal use of both the volume-based SSG and the price-based SSG 
during 1995-99
12--the post-Uruguay Round phase.  
                                                      
8 FAO  (2004). 
9 ICTSD(2005)  says:  ‘Developing countries have repeatedly emphasized that the SSM should not 
replicate the shortcomings of the SSG that have made its application very cumbersome.’ Page 65. 
10 These figures are not comparable with the estimates given by the FAO. This is because of two 
reasons. First, while these figures represent official WTO data covering the period 1995-2001, the 
FAO estimates are for 1995-2004. Second, the WTO figures do not include SSG use by a number of 
countries, namely, Barbados, Botswana, Bulgaria, Chinese Taipei, Ecuador, Guatemala, Israel, 
Morocco, Nicaragua and Panama. Among them Chinese Taipei is a major user of volume-based 
SSG.    
11  Republic of Korea is treated as a developing country in the WTO but it is a member of the OECD. 
12  See ‘Summary Report on the Nineteenth Meeting of The Committee On Agriculture Special Session   14
 
Figure 1.  Price-Trigger-based  SSG  Utilization  by  WTO  Member  Countries Between 









































































































Figure 2. Volume-trigger-based SSG Utilization by WTO Member Countries Between 
1995 and 2001 
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Source: Special Agricultural Safeguard, background paper by the Secretariat, WTO 
Document Number G/AG/NG/S/9/Rev.119, dated February 2002. Information on Barbados, 
Botswana, Bulgaria, Chinese Taipei, Ecuador, Guatemala, Israel, Morocco, Nicaragua and 
Panama is not included as these Members were not covered by the source used for this data. 
                                                                                                                                                        
   held on 1 July 2003: Note by the Secretariat’, WTO Document Number TN/AG/R/9, dated 25 
August 2003, pages 29-30.   15
Developing countries have also not been able to effectively use other safeguard provisions of 
the WTO. The Uruguay Round agreement allowed its Member countries another option to 
impose safeguard measures in case there was an influx of cheap and subsidized imports in a 
Member’s economy. A Member country could impose countervailing duties (CVD) against a 
certain commodity if they could show that the cheap imports were the results of subsidies 
given by another country and these imports were causing some harm to their domestic 
economy. However, during the implementation period, most developing countries found it 
difficult to impose these safeguard measures. Also, in most cases, imposition of CVD requires 
proof of injury which then needs to be authorized by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB). Many developing countries find it difficult to go through this legal procedure as they 
lack the technical abilities.  
 
Additionally, for agricultural goods, the ‘Peace Clause’ or Due Restraint Clause (Article 13 of 
the AoA) prohibited action against subsidies under the normal procedure of the Agreement on 
Subsidies. However, the Peace Clause has expired and a few cases involving agricultural 
products have been taken to the DSB by some developing countries.  
 
To sum up, the experience of the developing countries with WTO safeguard mechanisms 
show that the SSG instrument has not been utilized by most of them. Even when the SSG was 
available, in many cases, developing countries did not choose to utilize this option. In the 
current round of negotiations developing countries have emphasized that the SSM should be 
an improvement over the SSG.  
 
 
II.2  CONTINUED VOLATILITY OF INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICES 
 
One of the main reasons behind the demand of developing countries for a special safeguard is 
the continued high volatility or instability of international commodity prices. International 
commodity prices have, traditionally, been highly volatile in nature. A number of factors, 
both from the supply side as well as the demand side, contribute to this high volatility. From 
the supply side, a distinguishing feature of international agricultural trade is that only a 
limited number of exporting countries dominate international trade. Figure 3 shows that for 
certain crops, the share of the top five exporters can account for as much as 98 per cent. Even 
for a widely produced crop like rice the share of the top five exporters is more than 76 per 
cent and for all cereals the share of the top five is almost 75 per cent. As a result of this trade   16
pattern, any abnormal weather conditions or any other supply shocks in those exporting 
countries tend to have a very high impact on the aggregate supply and, hence, on international 
prices. The supply side scenario is further complicated because exports of some major 
agricultural commodities are dominated by a small number of large-scale multinational ‘grain 
majors’ and export state trading enterprises (‘single-desk sellers’). Therefore, any disturbance 
affecting a small number of suppliers tends to have an exaggerated reaction on the commodity 
prices at the international level
13.  
 
Figure 3. Share of Top five Exporters in the World Market 
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Source: Using data from Grethe and Nolte (2005). 
 
Moreover, for agricultural commodities, only a small percentage of total production actually 
enters trade. Therefore, compared to the total usage of these commodities, the exportable 
surplus is very low. For example, only about 4.5 per cent of total rice production is destined 
for the international market while, for wheat, the ratio is about 18.5 per cent (FAOSTAT). To 
put these figures into perspective, world rice trade is only about 20-22 per cent of India’s rice 
production. Because of such ‘thinness’ of the world agricultural market any large import 
demand from any of the medium or large importing countries can have a major impact on 
world prices
14. An example of such an experience was the sudden rise in the prices of major 
agricultural commodities in 1972, when world agricultural production fell because of 
                                                      
13 It is interesting to note here that the analogy of an hourglass is often used to describe the current 
structure of agribusiness. There are a large number of producers and buyers at the two ends and a 
very small set of processors and sellers in the middle.   
14  Parikh (1998) has estimated that if India enters the world rice market as an importer of 2.5 million 
tonnes, it will increase the international price by 24 per cent and if it imports 5 million tonnes of 
rice, it will increase the international price of rice by 72 per cent.   17
abnormal weather conditions worldwide, and the former Soviet Union's purchase of a huge 
amount of food from the world market further aggravated the situation.  A more recent 




To a certain extent, the shallowness of world commodity markets is attributable to measures 
like domestic and export subsidies undertaken in the developed countries. Subsidization 
results in depressed world prices and keeps many potential exporters away from the market. 
Recent findings of the DSB on sugar and cotton subsidies have established the causal 
relationship between farm subsidies, over-production of subsidized products and the 
consequent decline and volatility of international commodity prices.  
 
The problem of commodity price instability was recognized during the Uruguay Round and 
one of the major objectives of the AoA was to reduce the instability of international 
agricultural trade. The Ministerial Declaration launching the Uruguay Round says:  
‘There is an urgent need to bring more discipline and predictability to world agricultural 
trade by correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions including those related to 
structural surpluses so as to reduce the uncertainty, imbalance and instability in world 
agricultural markets.’  
 
It was expected that once the AoA managed to remove the distortions which have so far 
plagued global farm trade, more countries would be in a position to participate in the 
international trade in agricultural goods. It was hypothesized that by increasing the number of 
countries that would be open to world price signals, the ‘shocks’ (arising, say, from 
unexpected production shortfalls) would be absorbed by a greater number of markets, thus 
cushioning the effect of such shocks on world prices and bringing down price instability in 
global farm trade.  
 
However, if one looks back it appears that agricultural prices have remained quite volatile 
(Figure 4). To ascertain whether international agricultural price instability has reduced since 
the implementation of the AoA, we calculated volatility of international commodity prices for 
the pre and post-WTO period.  
                                                      


















































































































































































Non-Fuel Price Index includes Food and Beverages and Industrial Inputs Price Indices
Food and Beverage Price Index, includes Food and Beverage Price Indices
Food Price Index, includes Cereal, Vegetable Oils, Meat, Seafood, Sugar, Bananas, and
Oranges Price Indices
Beverage Price Index, includes Coffee, Tea, and Cocoa
Figure 4.  Movement of Price Indices during the WTO Implementation Period 
Source: International Monetary Fund 
We have used two methods to calculate volatility of international commodity prices. The first 
method is the standard measure of coefficient of variation, which is calculated as a ratio of 
standard deviation and mean.  
 
The second measure is taken from UNCTAD and is called the ‘Instability Index’. The   
Instability Index is defined as   
Instability Index = 1/n ∑ [ ( | Y(t) - y(t) | ) / y(t) ]*100 
where Y(t) is the observed magnitude of the variable, y(t) is the magnitude estimated by 
fitting an exponential trend to the observed value and n is the number of observations. The 
vertical bar indicates the absolute value (that is, disregarding signs). Accordingly, instability 
is measured as the percentage deviation of the variables concerned from their exponential 
trend levels for a given period. 
 
We have used the monthly commodity price data available from the website of the 
International Monetary Fund. Monthly data for the period January 1980 to February 2006 
have been used for the calculation. We have divided the data into two parts, for pre-WTO 
period, data for the months January 1980 to December 1994 has been used. For post WTO 
period, we have used data for the period January 1995 to February 2006.  Figure 5. and Figure 
6. show the volatility trends of some major commodity groups. More detailed commodity-
specific results are given in Annex Table A1.    19
Figure 5. Volatility of International Commodity Prices (measured by coefficient of variation) 
 
Volatility of International Commodity Prices of some Major 
Commodity Groups:
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Figure 6.  Volatility of International Commodity Prices (measured by the instability index) 
Volatility of International Commodity Prices of some Major 
Commodity Groups: 
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the IMF. 
These results show that, contrary to a priori expectations, there has been no systemic decline 
of volatility in the post-WTO period. In fact, in the post-Uruguay Round period, price 
volatility has gone up for a number of agricultural commodities. This is not surprising 
because the continued subsidization of agriculture and the dominance of a few developed 
countries in world agricultural trade have not allowed other countries to join the international 
farm trade. As a result, the depth of the international agricultural trade market has not 
increased. Therefore, prices of agricultural goods have remained as volatile as before.    20
 
Also, international commodity prices tend to be more volatile than domestic prices. In India, a 
study conducted by Nayyar and Sen (1994)
16 in the early 1990s revealed that the variation in 
price in the world market for agriculture is much more than that in the domestic market. 
Similar results have also been found by Bhattacharyya and Pal (2000) and Sekhar (2003).  
 
The apprehension among the economists is that in a tariff-only regime, high international 
commodity price volatility will get transmitted to the domestic market and will increase the 
price instability of the domestic market. High volatility of agricultural commodities alters the 
risk perception of farmers and introduces a speculative element in agricultural prices. This is 
likely to have serious implications for farmers in developing countries. Recently, a committee 
looking into the issue of the spate of suicides by farmers in Andhra Pradesh has found that the 
volatility of crop prices has been a major source of income instability and distress for farmers. 
In this backdrop of high instability in commodity prices and the possible threats associated 
with it, there is a strong case for an SSM for developing countries. Particularly, given the fact 
that tariff liberalization undertaken in the current round will reduce the overhang between 
bound and applied rates, availability of a safeguard mechanism will be very useful for 
developing countries. The results of this paper, which show that price volatility for many 
commodities has not declined in the post-WTO period, further strengthens the case. 
 
There might be an argument that, currently, world commodity prices are quite high and if 
high prices prevail in the international market then, even with volatility, the threat of import 
surges will be less. One should be careful about this line of argument because, as the Global 
Economic Prospects (GEP) 2006 points out, the period of rising agricultural commodity 
prices seems to be over and there are indications of a stabilization and even reversal of gains 
in the markets for agricultural products. In fact, according to the GEP 2006, agricultural 
prices have been declining throughout most of this year and are down by 5 per cent since 
March 2005.   
                                                      
16   Nayyar and Sen (1994) ‘International Trade and the Agricultural Sector in India’ in G. S. Bhalla 
(ed.) Economic Liberalization and Indian Agriculture. 
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II.3  PROPOSED  TARIFF  LIBERALIZATION IN AGRICULTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON 
 D EVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
In the previous section it was shown that volatility of international commodity prices has not 
come down in the post-WTO period and, also, that many empirical studies have found that 
volatility of international commodity prices is much higher than domestic commodity prices 
in most countries. Therefore, there is a concern among developing countries that further 
reduction of their tariff rates will make their economy more vulnerable to the fluctuations of 
international commodity prices.  In this section we take a look at the agricultural market 
access negotiations of the Doha Round and investigate how it is going to affect the 
developing country Members of the WTO.  
 
Prior to the Uruguay Round, most countries maintained QRs to protect their domestic 
markets. As QRs are non-price-based instruments and are physical restrictions on the volume 
of imports, they essentially insulate domestic markets from the price signals of international 
commodity markets. However, due to the rules of the Uruguay Round AoA, almost all 
countries have dismantled the QRs and moved into a tariff-only regime. Unlike QRs, tariff is 
a price-based mechanism and, therefore, under this regime, the instability of international 
commodity prices is likely to be transmitted directly to domestic markets
17. Because of this 
there has been a strong apprehension among developing countries that a sudden and sharp 
decline in the international prices of an agricultural commodity can lead to an import surge 
which, in turn, can damage the viability of domestic production.  
 
Though this concern prevailed even during the implementation of the AoA, most developing 
countries had felt that the tariff overhang (the gap between bound and applied tariff rates) 
would provide them with enough flexibility to protect their domestic markets from 
international price volatility (Figure 7. ). However, the steady decline and the continued 
volatility of international commodity prices for a significant part of the implementation period 
of the AoA have made the situation more complex. Many developing countries realized that 
even with the available headroom between bound and applied tariff rates, they might 
sometimes find it difficult to check import surges. In such cases, a temporary safeguard 
measure will allow them to tide over the crises by allowing them to raise tariffs above their 
bound levels for a limited duration. 
                                                      
17  However, even in a tariff-only regime there may not be a one to one correspondence between 
international and domestic prices. Domestic stock adjustments of agricultural goods may break that 
link.    22

















































































































































































Bound tariffs Applied Rates
  
In the current round of negotiations which, among other things, aims at ‘substantial 
improvements in market access’
18, there is also an emphasis on progressive liberalization of 
tariffs to ensure better market access for agricultural goods. Once these tariff cuts are 
implemented, the headroom between bound and applied tariff rates will come down. 
Simulation exercises suggest that the tariff reduction proposal tabled by the USA would leave 
India's bound tariff average at 38.3 per cent, marginally above its current applied average of 
37.9 per cent. On the other hand, the G-20
19 proposal would reduce Brazil's bound tariff rate 
from 35.7 per cent to 25.7. Simulations also show that the G-20 and the European Union 
proposals would ‘bite’ into 18.1 per cent of India's dutiable tariff lines, leaving 21.7 per cent 
of total farm imports subject to new reduced applied tariff rates. The US proposal would cut 
into almost a quarter of tariff lines, affecting 26.5 per cent of agriculture imports
20.  
 
Under these circumstances, a trade defense mechanism like the SSM will not only help 
developing countries protect their domestic economy from international price instability, but 
it will also make the country more confident to undertake tariff liberalization. In the next sub-
section we focus on India and attempt to find out the impact of the various tariff reduction 
formulas proposed in the present round of negotiations.  
Figure 7.  Bound and Applied Tariff Rates for some WTO Members (Agricultural 
Products)  
Source: USDA (http://www.ers.usda.gov/db/wto/) 
                                                      
18  Paragraph 13 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, WTO Document Number WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 
dated 20 November 2001 
19  Various country groupings of WTO are given in Annex Table A4. 
20  Source: Bridges Weekly, 24 May 2006, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/06-05-24/story1.htm   23
II.4  PROPOSED  TARIFF  LIBERALIZATION IN AGRICULTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A CASE STUDY OF INDIA 
 
During the Uruguay Round AoA, India opted for the ‘bound rate approach’ and imposed 
ceiling bindings on all its agricultural tariffs. Prior to the Uruguay Round, India had only 
bound some of its agricultural tariffs. These included commodities like rice, coarse grains, 
dairy products and edible oils. Rice and dairy products were bound in the Geneva Protocol 
(1947), maize and millet in the Torquay Protocol (1951), sorghum during the Dillon Round 
(1962) and soybean and rapeseed oil in the Tokyo Round (1979). In the Uruguay Round India 
bound its tariffs at 100, 150 or 300 per cent for previously unbound agricultural products.  
 
Till 1999, India had maintained zero duty on some foodgrains including rice. However, the 
steady decline in international prices and the threat of an import surge led India to renegotiate 
tariff bindings on some products including rice. The tariff re-negotiation became important 
because it was also realized at the time that the QRs India was having on the pretext of 
balance of payment (BoP) problems would no longer be allowed. India undertook tariff re-
negotiations under Article XXVIII of GATT and, as a result of it, in 1999-2000, bound tariffs 
on various rice types were raised from 0 to 70-80 per cent.  Table 3 gives the profile of India’s 
bound tariff rates both before and after the tariff renegotiations.  
 
Analysis of India’s agricultural tariff structure at the 6-digit harmonized system (HS) level 
shows that 4 per cent of the tariff lines are bound at 300 per cent. These products are mostly 
edible oils. More than 49 per cent of all agricultural products have bound tariff rates between 
75 to 100 per cent. The bound tariff for around 20 tariff lines is zero. These products include 
mostly cereals like rye, barley, oats, etc. Almost all tariffs are ad valorem and there are only a 
couple of instances of specific tariffs.  There are also a few commodities for which the 
applied rate is greater than the bound rate since, for these commodities, India is still in the 
process of implementing its Uruguay Round reduction commitments.  
 
Table 3 shows that India’s bound tariff rates are very high. More than 85 per cent of products 
have bound tariff rates of 75 per cent or more. However, the average applied rate in India is 
considerably lower than the average bound rate. India’s applied tariff structure for agricultural 
goods is shown in Table 4. Average bound tariff rate for India is more than 113 per cent while 
the average applied tariff rate is about 35 per cent. This gap between the bound and applied 
rate acts as a cushion against sudden international price drops and allows authorities to raise 
applied MFN (Most Favoured Nation) rates if and when required.   24
Table 3. Tariff -Structure of India: Bound Rates in the Agriculture Sector 









( per cent)  ( per cent)  ( per cent)  ( per cent)  ( per cent) 
0 to 25  5.4  13.2  3.8  18.8 
25 to  50  4.5  39.5  6.4  40.0 
50 to 75  3.8  56.0  4.3  59.2 
75 to 100  50.6  99.5  49.3  99.3 
100 to 150  32.0  150.0  32.5  150.0 
150 to 300  3.8  300.0  3.8  300.0 
 Source: FAO (2003)
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Table 4. Tariff -Structure of India: Applied Rates in the Agriculture Sector 
 
Range of Applied tariffs  Distribution of tariff lines  Simple average tariff 
( per cent)  ( per cent)  ( per cent) 
0 to 25  15.5  11.0 
25 to 50  73.8  30.5 
50 to 75  3.6  71.6 
75 to 100  5.8  95.1 
100 to 150  0.0  0.0 
150 and above  1.3  179.6 
All  690 (Number of tariff lines)  34.7 
 Source: FAO (2003) 
For most products the gaps between bound and applied rates are high and for some product 
categories the differential is more than 100 percentage points.  
Table 5 shows a few of such product categories. Figure 9 shows the difference for all 
agricultural product categories. Table 5 and Figure 9 show that for a large number of 
products, the gap between bound and applied tariff rates was quite high during the Uruguay 
Round implementation period.    
 
Though countries like India enjoyed considerable flexibility in the Uruguay Round because of 
the tariff overhang, the concern of India and many other developing countries has been that 
further tariff liberalization will erode much of the present tariff overhang. To ascertain the 
extent of this ‘flexibility erosion’ we now look at the agricultural market access negotiations 
in the Doha Development Round of trade talks. 
In the present round of trade talks, one of the major objectives is to ensure ‘substantial 
improvements in market access’
22 for agricultural goods. To attain this goal, it has been 
                                                      
21  http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/DOCREP/005/Y4632E/y4632e0g.htm 
22  Paragraph 13 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.   25
decided in the ‘July Framework’
23 that a tiered approach of tariff reduction will be undertaken 
where tariffs will be classified in bands based on the bound tariff rates. Product by product 
linear tariff cuts will be undertaken in each band. To ensure progressive reduction of tariff 
rates, reduction imposed on tariffs in higher bands will be more than those in the lower bands. 
Within this broad framework, various countries and country-groups have submitted their 
proposals. So far, no consensus has been achieved on the specific tariff reduction formula to 
be adopted in this round; however, the proposals by Members outline the broad contours 
within which the final reduction formula will lie.   
Table 5. Tariff Structure of Agricultural Products in India: Product Groups for which  
the gap between bound and applied tariff rates are high 








Oilseed oil  222.39  30.86  191.53 
Fats & oils  195.28  27.77  167.51 
Horticulture: cut flowers & foliage 150.00  10.00  140.00 
Coffee 137.50  10.00  127.50 
Tea & tea extracts  141.67  18.33  123.34 
Eggs 150.00  30.00  120.00 
Essential oils  150.00  38.57  111.43 
Fruit: Frozen  150.00  40.00  110.00 
Tobacco: products  150.00  40.00  110.00 
Vegetables: frozen or prepared (other)  120.33  13.46  106.87 
Coffee: other  137.50  32.50  105.00 
Meat: prepared  135.00  30.58  104.42 
Vegetables: dried & fresh roots & tubers  125.00  22.00  103.00 
Sweeteners 128.57  27.33  101.24 
Grain products  132.86  32.50  100.36 
Nuts & fruit: (dried, fresh, and prepared) 137.92  37.69  100.23 
Source: Calculations based on data from USDA (http://www.ers.usda.gov/db/wto/) 
 
Simulation exercises have been carried out to analyze the impact of various tariff reduction 
formulas on a country’s tariff structure. One such exercise by Australia has recently been 
submitted in a special session of the Committee on Agriculture
24. The results of the paper are 
given in Table 6.  The results show that the tariff reduction undertaken during the next 
implementation period of the AoA will significantly narrow the gap between bound and 
applied tariff rates. It is noteworthy that the formula proposed by the USA will virtually 
eliminate the gap between bound and applied rates for India. 
                                                      
23  Define July Framework 
24 ‘Applied Tariff Simulations–Agriculture: Summary of Results’, WTO Document Number 
JOB(06)/152, dated 22 May 2006.    26
Table 6. Various Tariff Reduction Formulas and their Impact on Average Bound and 
Applied Tariff Rates for India’s Agricultural Goods 
 Bound  Tariff  Applied  Tariff  Gap 
Initial 113.82  37.89  75.93 
G10 formula  85.30  35.60  49.7 
G20 formula  74.78  34.46  40.32 
The US formula  38.31  29.16  9.15 
Source: Committee on Agriculture: Special Session, WTO Document Number, JOB(06)/152. 
One shortcoming of the aforementioned paper is that it only provides a summarized version of 
the impact analysis and it may hide some important product-specific implications of the tariff 
reduction formulas. Here we carry out a more detailed exercise to look at the impact at the 6-
digit HS level. It will also help us to identify the tariff lines where the ‘tariff overhang’ after 
the cut will be minimal or zero. We use the G-20 tariff reduction formula for this exercise. 
We have used the G-20 formula because it is neither too ambitious like the US formula nor is 
it too defensive like the G-10 formula. Also, there is a widespread feeling among the 
negotiators that the final tariff reduction formula will be a close approximation of the G-20 
formula. The complete G-20 formula is shown in Table 7.  
Table 7. G-20 Formula for Tariff Reduction 
Developed countries  Developing countries 
Thresholds (in AVEs)  Tariff Reductions  Thresholds (in AVEs)  Tariff Reductions 
Less than 20 percent  45 per cent  Less than 30 percent  25 per cent 
More than 20 and less 
than 50 percent 
55 per cent  More than 30 and less 
than 80 percent 
30 per cent 
More than 50 and less 
than 75 percent 
65 per cent  More than 80 and less 
than 130 percent 
35 per cent 
More than 75  75 per cent  More than 130  40 per cent 
Note: There are also proposals to introduce tariff caps at 100 per cent for developed 
countries and at 150 per cent for developing countries. But the status of tariff cap is unclear 
and we have not factored that in this simulation.  
 
For the simulation we calculate what India’s bound tariff rates will be if the G-20 reduction 
schedule is imposed on India. Then we compare the resultant bound tariffs with the applied 
tariff rates for these products. For this analysis, we have used the applied tariff data for India 
for the year 2004. The results of this simulation exercise in shown in Figure 8
25. It is clear 
from the figure that after implementing the tariff cuts proposed by the G-20 countries the 
                                                      
25  These results may not exactly match the results given in Table as the paper by Australia assumes 8 
per cent sensitive products, while we have not taken the sensitive products into account while 
running the simulation. The main justification behind this omission is that there has not been any 
convergence of opinion about the coverage or the treatment of sensitive products yet and even if a 
certain number of products are selected as sensitive products, it will be wrong to prejudge those 
products.   27
tariff overhang will either disappear or will become negligible for a number of products. 
However, there will be some gaps between bound and applied rates for quite a few products 
in India. In fact, for a number of products, the current applied rates are higher than the post-
cut bound rates. So India will have to bring down the applied rates for these products. 
 
Some important products where the gap between applied and bound rates are going to be low 
or negative are some varieties of coffee and tea, sugar, rice, maize, cloves, cardamoms, bay 
leaves, fresh grapes, apples, plums and sloes, some varieties of nuts, sorghum, millet, dairy 
and various vegetable products. The full list at the 6-digit HS level is given in Annex Table 
A2. 
 
This case study of India clearly indicates that the new market access proposals--even the less 
ambitious ones--are going to significantly erode the tariff overhang enjoyed by the developing 
countries. In this situation, and given the high volatility of international commodity prices, the 
provision of a safeguard instrument like an SSM will definitely be a very important policy 
instrument for developing countries. It is not surprising that many countries have indicated 
that unless an SSM is provided it will be almost impossible for them to undertake the 
progressive tariff liberalization rules which the present round of trade talks is going to impose 
on them. 
Figure 8. Results of the Tariff Cut Simulation for India (using the G-20 formula) 
 
Note: The heavy black line denotes the bound ad valorem rate for agricultural products. These tariffs 
are given at HS 6 digit level. Products are sorted on the X-axis based on descending order of bound 
tariff rates. Product names could not be given in the graph because 690 names could not be 
accommodated. The applied rates are for the year 2004. For a few products applied MFN rate seems 
to be higher than the bound rate. Detailed data are available from the authors. 
Source: Agricultural Market Access Database (www.amad.org) for bound tariff rates, India’s 
Customs Tariff manual (2004) for data on applied tariff rates.    28
Figure 9. Bound and Applied Tariff Rates in India 
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Source: USDA (http://www.ers.usda.gov/db/wto/)   29
 
II.5  VULNERABILITY OF FARMERS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
 
Developing countries have been arguing that the relevance of the agriculture sector for 
developed and developing countries is fundamentally different and should not be treated in 
the same manner. This argument is backed by the fact that whereas agriculture accounts for 2 
per cent of GDP and less than 4 per cent of employment in developed countries, the share of 
agriculture in the GDP of low-income countries is as high as 24 per cent and it provides more 




The 2005 edition of the annual publication of the FAO, called ‘State of Food Insecurity in the 
World’, shows that for the years 2000-2 there were more than 814 million undernourished 
people in developing countries. This figure is, approximately, about 17 per cent of the total 
population of the developing countries. A glance at the geographical distribution of 
undernourished people across the world shows that South Asia (301 million), East Asia 
(151.7 million), China (142.1 million), sub-Saharan Africa (203.5 million) and East Africa 
(86.2 million) are the major trouble spots. India, with 221.1 million undernourished people, is 
the worst affected country. Similar indicators also show that a very large number of people in 
developing countries live in abject poverty with minimum or zero access to many basic 
amenities of life. As the FAO report indicates, a very large proportion of this undernourished 
population is dependant on agriculture for its food security and livelihood. 
 
To a large extent, the plight of the poor in developing countries can be traced to the structural 
limitations of the agriculture sector in these countries. In most developing countries, 
agriculture is dominated by small and marginal farmers who are engaged in subsistence 
farming. Farming in these countries is also characterized by low level of commercialization of 
agriculture, low productivity, weak market orientation, lack of infrastructure, high 
dependence on weather and susceptibility to natural calamities. As a result, most of the 
farmers are very poor and lack any risk-taking ability. As Ruffer et al (2002) also point out, 
these farmers often do not have access to any insurance mechanisms and safety nets because 
                                                      
26  Figures are from World Development Indicators 2005 and Global Employment Trends 2005, ILO   30




The combination of high poverty and low risk-taking ability makes farmers in developing 
countries extremely vulnerable to any exogenous shocks. These countries argue that given the 
inability of the farmers to bear risks arising out of any external shocks, an effective safeguard 
mechanism for preventing a surge in imports becomes absolutely essential for preserving their 
livelihood
28. It has also been pointed out that standard WTO safeguard instruments may not 
be effective enough for this purpose. The WTO has a set of safeguard measures to tackle 
emergency situations. However, to invoke these standard safeguard mechanisms a Member 
country has to go through a lengthy administrative procedure. The complaining country has to 
prove that an import surge or price depression has occurred. Second, based on a number of 
indicators mentioned in the Agreement, it has to prove that the surge in imports is having 
adverse effects on its domestic economy. Third, it has to establish that there exists a clear 
causal link between the import surge and the adverse effect. And, finally, it must properly 
identify and account for (non-attribution) injury caused by other factors (besides imports).  
 
Given the nature of agriculture in developing countries, the complex provisions of general 
safeguards available under the Agreement on Safeguards are extremely time consuming and 
may not provide timely protection to the distressed population. Therefore, to protect the 
vulnerable section of the farming community, there is a necessity for a quick-acting and easy 
to administer safeguard instrument. A special safeguard mechanism on the lines of the special 
safeguard provisions (Article 5) of the AoA is an instrument better suited for these countries 
because, to invoke this type of safeguards, it is sufficient to establish that an import surge or a 
                                                      
27  Indian agriculture is currently going through a major stagnation. In the context of the present paper 
and to highlight the vulnerability of farmers from developing countries, it will be relevant to quote a 
paragraph from the 4
th Report (submitted on 13 April 2006) of the National Commission of Farmers. 
The report, while describing Indian agriculture in 2005, says: ‘The spoilage losses can be as high as 
30 per cent in the case of vegetables and fruits. Institutions, which are supposed to help farmers, 
such as research, extension, credit and input supply agencies, are by and large not pro-poor and 
pro-women. Mechanisms for risk mitigation are poor or absent. Hardly 10 per cent of farmers are 
covered by crop insurance. Farm families are also not covered by health insurance. There is no 
Agricultural Risk Fund. Both risk mitigation and price stabilization are receiving inadequate policy 
support. According to farmers, the cost of production is invariably higher than the Minimum 
Support Price, due to ever increasing prices of diesel and other inputs. Investment in agriculture 
has suffered a decline over the past two decades. Capital formation in agriculture and allied sectors 
in relation to GDP started declining in the 1980s and is only now being reversed. This has adversely 
affected irrigation and rural infrastructure development.’ Page 1.  
28  See WTO Document Number G/AG/NG/W/102.   31
sharp price decline has occurred and is occurring. No proof of injury, causation or non-
attribution is required.     
II.6  INCREASED INCIDENCES OF IMPORT SURGES 
 
The arguments in favor of an SSM for developing countries have got a further boost from a 
recent set of in-depth studies done under the ‘FAO Import Surge Project’ on the various facets 
of an import surge and their impact on developing countries. Under this project, Nigris (2005) 
studies the frequency of import surges across various countries and commodities for the 
period 1984 to 2003. The author has defined import surge as a ‘30 percent positive deviation 
from a three-year moving average of import data and, alternately, as one standard error 
above the moving average’
29. Using this definition, his findings show that import surges have 
occurred more frequently in the post-1994 period with only a few exceptions. He has found 
out that the percentage occurrence of import surges (under the 30 per cent deviation) is higher 
in the post-1994 period for all commodities--the only exceptions being wheat, rice, maize and 
palm oil. As far as the countries are concerned, his results show that though almost all 
countries have experienced import surges, some were affected more often than others. 
According to his findings, import surges were more frequent in India and Bangladesh (Asia), 
Zimbabwe, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana and Malawi (Africa) and Ecuador and Honduras (Latin 
America). 
 
Under the same project, another paper by Sharma (2005) has listed a number of case studies 
where import surges have negatively affected domestic production. A few of these cases are 
worth mentioning here. For example, in Sri Lanka, vegetable-producing sub-sectors like 
onions and potatoes have suffered from import surges. In 1999, an import surge of onions and 
potatoes resulted in a decline in the cultivated area of these crops and affected the livelihood 
of approximately 300,000 persons involved in their production and marketing. As there were 
not many options for the affected farmers to diversify into other crops, the economic effects 
of this import surge have been significantly negative. Similarly, in two other widely cited 
cases, rice production in Haiti (in the late 1980s) and Honduras (in the early 1990s) suffered 
from import surges. What is even more disturbing is that, in both the cases, import surges 
have inflicted a permanent damage to the production of rice. According to Sharma, this 
                                                      
29  Sharma (2005).   32
situation is known as ‘material retardation’ where imports prevent the revival of the industry 
following a shock.  
 
The discussion in the above section highlighted the fact that due to structural problems with 
agriculture in developing countries, a very large number of people depending on this sector 
are highly vulnerable to exogenous shocks like international price spikes. Therefore, the 
availability of special safeguard instruments like SSMs will be imperative for protecting the 
livelihood of these people. This requirement becomes even more important because evidences 
show that incidences of import surges have increased in the post-Uruguay Round period and 
there are a number of cases where these import surges have resulted in material injury and 
loss of production base in developing countries.  
   
III  SPECIAL SAFEGUARD MECHANISMS IN THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT 
ROUND OF TRADE TALKS 
 
During the mandated (Article 20) re-negotiations on agriculture, there was a convergence of 
opinion among Members that a special safeguard instrument in the line of the SSG should be 
given to developing and least developed countries. The Doha Ministerial Declaration did not 
explicitly mention about agricultural safeguards but had a tacit approval for such measures. 
While discussing the Doha Work Program the Ministerial Declaration says: 
‘We agree that special and differential treatment for developing countries shall be an integral 
part of all elements of the negotiations and shall be embodied in the Schedules of concessions 
and commitments and as appropriate in the rules and disciplines to be negotiated, so as to be 
operationally effective and to enable developing countries to effectively take account of their 
development needs, including food security and rural development.  We take note of the non-
trade concerns reflected in the negotiating proposals submitted by Members and confirm that 
non-trade concerns will be taken into account in the negotiations as provided for in the 
Agreement on Agriculture.’
30   
 
The Harbinson’s text or the first draft modalities paper introduced the term Special Safeguard 
Measure or SSM. However, the Harbinson’s text initially perceived very limited coverage of 
the SSM. Subsequent revisions of the Harbinson’s text and the Derbez text (the draft Cancun 
Ministerial Text), however, suggested more widespread availability of SSM among 
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developing countries. The July Framework categorically mentions that an SSM will be 
established for use by developing-country Members. A more detailed exposition of the SSM 
was made in the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, which explicitly mentions that 
developing countries will have the right to impose both price-trigger and volume-trigger-
based SSMs.  
 
Table 8 shows how the concept of SSM and its coverage and applicability have evolved 
through various official WTO documents during the present round of trade talks.  
 
Table 8.  Official WTO positions on SSM  
 




18 Dec 2002  Whether, in the framework of special and differential treatment, a new 
safeguard mechanism and/or countervailing measure for developing 
countries should be established and, if so, for all agricultural products or 
for a limited number of products such as strategic/food security/livelihood 
products? Detailed possible modalities for such provisions have been 
submitted. 




17 February 2003  For SP products, developing countries shall have the flexibility to apply a 
special safeguard mechanism to be based on the provisions of Article 5 of 
the Agreement on Agriculture. This right shall be reserved by designating 
in their Schedules with the symbol “SSM” the products concerned. Only 
products designated in this way in the Schedule, as well as items already 
currently covered and designated with the symbol “SSG”, shall be eligible 
for measures under Article 5. 
Harbinson Text, Second 
Draft 
(TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1) 
18  March  2003  An outline of a possible new special safeguard mechanism to enable 
developing countries to effectively take account of their development 
needs, including food security, rural development and livelihood security 
concerns, is currently subject to technical work and will be included at the 
appropriate stage in Attachment 2. The right to invoke this mechanism 
shall be reserved by designating in Schedules with the symbol “SSM” the 
products concerned. 
Pérez del Castillo Text 
or Draft Cancun 
Ministerial Text 
(JOB(03)/150) 
24 August 2003  A special agricultural safeguard (SSM) shall be established for use by 
developing countries subject to conditions and for products to be 
determined. 
 




13 Sep 2003  A special agricultural safeguard (SSM) shall be established for use by 





1 August 2004  An SSM will be established for use by developing country Members  
Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration 
(WT/MIN(05)/DEC) 
22 December 2005  Developing country Members will also have the right to have recourse to a 
Special Safeguard Mechanism based on import quantity and price triggers, 
with precise arrangements to be further defined. Special Products and the 
Special Safeguard Mechanism shall be an integral part of the modalities 
and the outcome of negotiations in agriculture. 
Source: Official WTO documents. WTO document numbers are given in brackets. 
If one looks at the country positions regarding SSM, most developing countries demanded 
that the right to impose special agricultural safeguards should be given to all developing and 
least developed countries in the WTO. Many developing countries--and some developed 
countries like Australia--also argued that the SSG provisions for developed countries must be   34
abolished in the present round of negotiations. For example, in its submission to the WTO, a 
group of developing countries says
31: 
‘Prohibit developed countries from the use of the Special Safeguard Clause.  This Clause 
instead should be opened up to all developing countries.  Developing countries should be 
allowed to invoke this based on low prices or excess volume’ (WTO document number 
G/AG/NG/W/13, dated 23 June 2000). 
 
On the other hand, most developed countries (including the European Commission, Norway 
and Japan), while supporting the demand by developing countries to have access to a special 
safeguard provision, wanted the SSG to continue for developed countries as well. However, 
the USA seems to have a very strong and extreme view on special safeguards. In a recent 
submission to the WTO
32, the USA says that SSGs should be eliminated on the first day of the 
implementation of the Doha Round Agreements. It also suggests that developing countries 
may use the SSM, under some very strict conditions, till the end of the implementation of the 
Doha Round. In spite of hectic negotiations on the issue of the SSM, a number of critical 
issues remain unresolved. Particularly, there is a division among the countries about the 
coverage and usability of SSMs. A snapshot of country positions is given in Table 9. 
 
Table  9. A Summary of Country Positions on SSM in the Doha Round   
 
Country/Country Groups  Position 
G-33, most developing countries including India  Comprehensive Coverage of SSM. SSMs are fundamental 
to economic development and should not be constrained in 
its use. SSM should only be available to developing 
countries and SSG should be abolished. 
Developed and developing countries who are big agricultural 
exporters (Thailand, Australia, Canada), mostly Cairns Group 
Members (Brazil has been quite non-committal on SSMs)  
G-33 position too protectionist, Can hurt South-South farm 
trade. SSM should be limited in its use and coverage. SSG 
should be abolished. 
EU  and  G-10  Generally not much objection to SSM but feel G-33 
proposed coverage is somewhat protectionist. Want SSG 
to continue  
USA  Proposes extremely limited coverage and usage of SSM, 
hints at injury test, SSM should be abolished by the end of 
Doha Round, SSG should be abolished at the start of the 
Doha Round 
Source: Based on country submissions to WTO and reports by the ‘Bridges Weekly’.  
                                                      
31  Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri 
Lanka and El Salvador. 
32  Job(06)/120, dated 24 April 2006   35
The contentious issues regarding SSMs have been earmarked in a recent note prepared by the 
chairman of agriculture negotiations. In this note, the chairman has highlighted the following 
issues
33: 
1.  What is the coverage of tariff lines that would be eligible for the SSM and should this be 
based on self-selection, guided by criteria or based on specific criteria and, if so, what 
are these criteria? 
2.  For the import quantity triggers, what should be the methodology for calculating the 
trigger including factors such as base period(s), trigger quantities, cases where no or 
minimal quantities were imported in the base period, etc.? 
3.  On what basis should the quantity-based SSM be calculated? 
4.  For the import price triggers, what should be the methodology for calculating the trigger, 
including base period(s), the degree, if any, of the price fall permitted before the SSM 
can be triggered, etc.?  
5.  On what basis should the price-based SSM be calculated? 
In the following sections, we will analyze these issues, review the country positions and try to 
provide answers to some of these questions. 
 
IV  SOME OPERATIONAL ISSUES REGARDING THE SSMs 
IV.1  COVERAGE OR PRODUCT ELIGIBILITY FOR SPECIAL SAFEGUARD MEASURES  
 
Product coverage for SSMs is probably the most contentious issue about SSM administration 
in the current round of trade talks. Most developing countries are of the opinion that the SSM 
should have a broad coverage and should be available for most if not all products. However, 
some countries, which are essentially agricultural exporters, feel that a wide coverage of 
products will lead to increased protectionism and, hence, they want a limited availability of 
the SSM. For example, the USA is of the opinion that the coverage of SSMs should be 
restricted and should be limited to a certain ‘percent of tariff lines at the detailed duty level 
that take the full tariff cut as specified by the general tariff reduction formula for developing 
countries which result in new bound tariffs below current applied tariffs; and products that 
are produced domestically or are close substitutes of products produced domestically’ 
(United States Communication on Special Agricultural Safeguard (SSG) and the Special 
Safeguard Mechanism (SSM), JOB(06)/120, dated 24 April 2006). 
                                                      
33  ‘Chairperson’s questions for post-Hong Kong talks’, dated 9
th February 2006,  
   http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_questions_e.htm#questions.   36
Most developing countries, including the G-33, the African group, the ACP group, and the 
least developed countries, strongly objected to this proposal and commented that the SSM is 
required to address their legitimate non-trade concerns and proposals to restrict its usage is 
not acceptable to them
34. The position taken by these countries is not unjust because there is 
no a priori reason to restrict the use of the SSM. This is so because of four reasons.  
 
First, developing countries are demanding instruments like SSMs and SPs to protect the food 
security and livelihoods of low income and resource poor farmers from the uncertainties 
associated with international trade. These objectives are perfectly consistent with the mandate 
of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and, therefore, no constraints should be imposed to 
reduce the effectiveness of these instruments. Moreover, the SSM is an emergency measure 
which will only be applied if there is a sudden surge in imports or depression in price. The 
volume and price triggers can be defined in such a manner so as to ensure that SSMs are only 
applicable in very special situations. Given these restrictions, it is not necessary that SSMs 
should be restricted further through product coverage.  
 
Second, the results of the ‘FAO Import Surge Project’ show that import surges have occurred 
across a very wide range of products and if product coverage is restricted it is almost certain 
that some developing countries will face problems protecting their domestic economy from 
such import surges.  
 
Third, the distortions of world agriculture and the associated problems of excessive price 
volatility and price depression are largely attributable to the production and trade distorting 
subsidies given by developed countries. Simulation results clearly indicate that the Doha 
Round will not lead to a substantial reduction of these subsidies
35. Unless these distortions are 
completely removed, the rights of developing countries to impose safeguards should not be 
constrained. 
 
Finally, the fear that the universal availability of SSMs may lead to protectionism may not be 
justified. As mentioned before, SSMs are only applicable if the conditionalities for their 
application are fulfilled. There can be built-in mechanisms to prevent misuse. But, more 
importantly, historical evidence of the usage of SSGs by the eligible developing countries in 
                                                      
34  WTO Document Number TN/AG/GEN/17, dated  11 May, 2006 
35 See Pal (2005 and 2006).   37
the Uruguay Round has shown that availability of SSGs to some developing countries did not 
result in either overuse or abuse of the safeguard. In fact, developed countries used SSGs 
much more intensively than the developing ones. So the concern that widespread availability 
of SSMs will lead to protectionism may not be justified.  
 
However, given the objective of SSMs, it appears that there is a case to restrict the SSMs to 
domestically produced goods and to goods which are substitutes of domestically produced 
goods. 
 
IV.2  TRIGGER MECHANISMS FOR PRICE-BASED AND VOLUME-BASED SSMS  
 
In administering a volume-trigger-based safeguard measure, an important requirement is to 
define what exactly constitutes an import surge. Similarly, for a price-trigger-based 
mechanism it is important to define a ‘price depression’. To a large extent, the effectiveness 
of the safeguard mechanism depends on these definitions. To have an effective safeguard 
measure, the threshold of volume and price triggers should not be set so high that the usability 
of the safeguard mechanism is compromised but, on the other hand, it should not be set so 
low that the safeguard becomes too easy to invoke and essentially becomes a trade restrictive 
measure. 
 
In the current round of negotiations, countries have suggested alternate views on volume 
triggers. The G-33 has suggested that even a 5 per cent increase from the average volume of 
imports of the preceding three years can set off a volume trigger. On the other hand, the USA 
is of the opinion that an SSM can be invoked only if imports are 130 per cent of yearly 
average MFN imports over the most recent 36-month period, or 130 per cent of the yearly 
average 2002-4 MFN imports. Nigris (2005) has conducted extensive research on volume 
surge under the ‘FAO Import Surge Project’. He has used two alternate approaches for 
identifying a surge. They are:  
1.  Moving Average based measures: An import surge is defined as a 30 per cent positive 
deviation from a 3-year moving average of import data and, alternately, as one standard 
error above the moving average: or  
2.  The AoA volume trigger definition of SSG. 
Interestingly, Nigris finds that, compared to the moving average method, the SSG definition 
identifies a much larger number of cases as incidences of ‘import surge’.     38
It is to be noted here that within the Moving Average method, the threshold selected for 
identifying ‘import surges’ has a significant impact on the frequency of import surges 
reported. For example, data reported by Nigris show that for the period 1982-2003 and for 
wheat, changing the threshold from 10 per cent positive deviations from 3-year moving 
averages to 50 per cent brings down the reported cases of import surges from 609 to 100. 
Similarly, if a 5-year moving average is chosen over the 3-year moving average, then it 
increases the number of reported ‘import surges’. These results underscore the fact that the 
parameters chosen for determining import surges will have a significant impact on the 
working of the new SSM and WTO Members must arrive at a consensus on these critical 
operational issues. Erring on either side will negatively affect the purpose of SSMs. Also, 
there may be a case to have a price element to the volume trigger. If a surge in import volume 
takes place without a decline in international price, the logic of imposing an SSM is 
somewhat weak. In this kind of a situation, imports are dictated more by domestic demand 
and production imbalances rather than international conditions.  
 
When defining price trigger, it must be kept in mind that WTO safeguards do not intend to 
insulate countries from low agricultural prices emerging from long-term or secular decline of 
commodity prices. But the objective of the safeguard instrument is to protect the member 
countries from short-term price instability and the resultant sudden import surges. Therefore, 
for a price-trigger-based SSM, the following factors need to be clearly defined.  
 
First, one should define the method to calculate a reference price. As Valdes and Foster 
(2005) have pointed out, there are several methods of doing so, including price trends and 
moving averages of various lengths, base-period average prices, the preceding year’s price, 
and a minimum average cost of the world’s ‘most efficient’ exporter. In the negotiations, 
Moving Average based methods have found support among many countries. However, Valdes 
and Foster suggest that moving average may not be the most appropriate technique to use as 
they found it to be ‘inconsistent with the objective of protecting against exceptionally low 
prices’. They find regression-trend-based methods to be better. In this context, we can 
propose that a variant of the method used by UNCTAD to calculate price instability can be 
used for calculating reference price for an SSM. UNCTAD uses an exponential-trend-based 
technique and Members can consider using it for calculating reference prices. It is notable 
here that the method used in the Uruguay Round was based on fixed base period reference 
price and the reference period coincided with a low-price phase of international commodity   39
price cycle. As a result, many countries could not use the SSM effectively during the 
implementation period.   
 
Second, it is also required to define the length of the period for calculating long-term trend. 
Generally, a 3 to 5-year period (based on monthly data) can be suggested for calculating 
reference prices. 
 
Finally, there should be a definition of price depression, that is, a definition of what 
percentage deviation from the trend line actually constitutes a surge. A 20 per cent drop below 
the reference price can be thought of as the price trigger. The G-33 will find it difficult to 
push its demand (that the trigger should be activated when the price drops 5 per cent below 
the reference price) in this round of negotiations.   
 
Overall, we feel that price-trigger-based mechanisms are superior to volume-trigger-based 
mechanisms. The volume trigger is an ex-post defense and it can only be activated if a 
sufficiently large quantity of import already gets into a country. Therefore, some amount of 
damage may already occur before imposing the SSM. On the other hand, price-trigger-based 
mechanisms are superior as they can be triggered in the wake of a fall in international prices 
and can, thereby, pre-empt any damage to the domestic agriculture.  
 
IV.3  THE SUNSET CLAUSE OR THE EXPIRY DATE FOR SSM  
 
An SSM, by definition, is a temporary mechanism. Therefore, for such a mechanism, it is 
important to have a provision for a sunset clause. It was decided that an SSG invoked any 
time during the year would automatically lapse at the end of that calendar year, that is, on  
December 31 of that year. If the country wished to continue the special safeguard it would 
have to take stock of the situation and analyze whether the surges which necessitated the 
safeguard were still there. This mechanism worked satisfactorily for SSG and it can be 
continued for SSM.  
 
For price-trigger-based mechanism, we propose that the Member-country government should 
be given at least six months time to ensure that the price decline which initiated the safeguard   40
action has corrected itself.  To elaborate, suppose the price of a certain commodity dips below 
the trigger level and the price-trigger-based SSM is activated in January. Then, in April, the 
international price of that commodity touches or exceeds its trend level (either moving 
average or exponential trend, depending on the indicator the price trigger is based on). We 
propose that the Member country should be allowed to continue the SSM at least for the next 
six months (till October) to ensure that the upward movement of the international price is not 
merely a short-run price fluctuation. And during these six months the monthly international 
price of that commodity should be consistently above the price-trigger level. 
 
V  PROPOSED METHODOLOGY FOR AN ALTERNATE PRICE-TRIGGER-
BASED SSM 
 
In this section, we propose a price-based SSM which we feel satisfies the criteria of  
a) providing enough latitude to developing countries to protect their domestic economy from 
price fluctuations and  
b) it has a built-in mechanism to prevent overuse or excessive protectionist use of the 
safeguard instrument by the countries. Here we assume the price trigger is already decided 
and is based on a 3 or 5 year Moving Average of international prices.  
The following points should be kept in mind while formulating a methodology for applying 
an SSM. 
1.  The SSM is a temporary trade defense mechanism to counter the volatility of international 
commodity prices.   
2.  The idea behind the SSM is to protect the domestic sector of the country from short-term 
fluctuation in prices. However, the SSM should not insulate the country from the long-run 
price movements of agricultural commodities. 
3.  SSMs can be imposed both through price trigger or volume trigger. Price trigger is more 
important as it allows the government to pre-empt the damage. However, in some cases 
volume triggers may become useful. 
4.  The methodology for applying the SSM should be transparent and easy to administer and 
to comprehend. Determination of injury should not be built into the administration of the 
SSM. The SSM is a ‘quick-acting’ mechanism and, therefore, should not be overly 
complicated.   41
Given these broad parameters, we propose that a variable-levy-based instrument can be used 
to implement a price-trigger-based SSM. A variable levy increases or decreases in response to 
changes in world prices of imported goods in such a way that the import price after payment 
of the duty remains steady. It may be noted here that countries of the European Union have 
used the variable-levy-based system and, in India, the Commission of Agricultural Cost and 




We feel that this instrument will fulfill all the objectives of the SSM mentioned above and it 
will also be transparent and easy to administer. It may be noted here that variable levy is not 
allowed in the Uruguay Round AoA. But the suggestion made here is for it to be used as an 
SSM only. The details of the proposed SSM are given below. 
As mentioned before, the objective of the SSM is to protect a country from short-term price 
fluctuations but not to insulate the country from long-term price signals. Therefore, to 
formulate a methodology for applying the SSM, it is first necessary to define the ‘long-term 
price’ for a certain commodity. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that a 3-year or 5-year 
moving average of international prices is taken as the long-term price for a certain 
commodity. Let us call this price P*MA. 
Let us further assume that if the international price of a certain commodity dips X per cent 
below its PMA, then a price trigger can be applied. Here we propose that a variable-tariff-based 
mechanism can be a useful safeguard device. Assuming that the conditions for activating a 
price trigger are fulfilled, a developing country Member may be allowed to use a variable 
tariff rate against the import of the product in concern. The variable tariff rate will be 
inversely related with the international price of the commodity. This will give the Member 
country the full flexibility to adjust the tariff rate to the decline and instability of international 
prices.  
We also suggest that the Member country should be free to choose a suitable variable tariff 
formula for protecting its domestic market. However, to ensure that the Member country is 
a)   not overly protecting its domestic market or  
b)  using a tariff rate which is insulating the country from the long-run price movements of 
that particular commodity  
                                                      
36  ‘Reports of the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices for the Crops Sown during 1998-99 
Season’, New Delhi: Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Government of India.   42
the following ceiling/condition for applying the variable tariff rate will be imposed: 
) 1 ( * P     )       (1 * P MA var bound iable tariff tariff + ≤ + … 1 
where P* is the international price of a commodity, P*MA is the 3 or 5-year moving average of 
international prices of that commodity (the moving average price at the time of surge can be 
used), tariffvariable is a variable tariff rate inversely related to P* and tariffbound is the bound 
tariff rate for the product (the bound tariff rate can be the Doha Round bound tariff rate for the 
product).   
The gap (tariffeffective - tariffbound) can be considered as the Special Safeguard component 







 P & & is the targeted import price and the restriction on P & & is 
) 1 ( * bound MA tariff P P + ≤ & & . 
Figure 10 shows the graphical exposition of the price-trigger-based SSM we are suggesting 
here. 
Figure 10. A Graphical Exposition of the Variable Levy Based SSM 
 
 
The advantages of such a simple SSM are manifold. It provides a developing country with a 
flexible safeguard mechanism, it sets only an upper bound (the country is free to choose the 
appropriate tariff adjusted landed price it wishes to target through its variable levy), it is less 
cumbersome to administer and it includes a built-in check to prevent prohibitive tariffs. A 
simulation of this formula against different scenarios is given in Annex Table A3.  
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Though this methodology is framed for a price-trigger-based mechanism, a similar concept 
for ceiling tariff rate can also be thought of
37 in case of volume triggers. For example, G-33 
has recently proposed a formula for a volume-trigger-based SSM (Table 3). To ensure that 
implementation of such a formula is not overly defensive, one can propose to use the SSM 
component of it in conjunction with some variant of a ceiling tariff level mentioned above. 
Table 3. Volume Trigger Based SSM Proposed by G33 
Import Volume  SSM Component 
less than 5 per cent increase over the three-
year average 
No SSM 
5-10 per cent increase over the three-year 
average 
50 per cent of bound rate or 40 percentage 
points 
10-30 per cent increase over the three-year 
average 
75 per cent of bound rate or 50 percentage 
points 
More than 30 per cent increase over the 
three-year average 
100 per cent of bound rate or 60 percentage 
points 
 
VI  DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND POSSIBLE PROBLEMS WITH 
IMPLEMENTATION OF SSM 
 
Even if the WTO allows the use of SSMs, one concern that has been expressed by many 
analysts is whether some of the poorer and less developed Members of the WTO will have the 
infrastructure and the state machinery to actually implement it effectively. Volume-trigger-
based SSMs imply that a country will have to centrally monitor imports from all its ports and 
on a shipment basis. Second, there is some confusion whether imports coming through 
regional trading partners will be counted for invoking volume-trigger-based SSMs. It is likely 
that these imports will have to be tackled separately as most Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTAs) tend to have clauses preventing countries from imposing safeguards on imports 
coming from regional partners. This requires further monitoring and classification of imports 
on a ‘rules of origin’ basis. It is obvious that for this kind of monitoring a good infrastructure 
in information technology needs to be established. Many developing and least developed 
Member countries may not have the backbone of such infrastructure and trade facilitation.  In 
comparison, price-based safeguards are easier to monitor. International price data are 
available on a daily basis and it is not at all difficult to identify a price depression. However, 
since the special safeguards are quick-acting mechanisms, in both cases it is required that 
there be co-ordination between the government agencies which monitor imports (typically the 
customs department and the Ministry of Commerce) and the agency which formulates tariff 
policies (typically the Ministry of Finance). Only then can these instruments be used 
                                                      
37  It must be mentioned here that the case for a safeguard is somewhat weaker when an import surge is 
not accompanied by an import price decline.   44
effectively. There is an apprehension that many developing and least developed countries may 
not at present have such a well coordinated system in place.  As a result, their ability to take 




In the Doha Round of trade negotiations, developing countries are demanding that a special 
agricultural safeguard be made available to them. Analysis done in this paper shows that 
developing countries have a number of valid reasons to seek an SSM in this round. The most 
fundamental reason is that international commodity prices are extremely volatile and bound 
tariff rates may not be enough to protect countries from the gyrations of international 
commodity prices. Calculations done in this paper show that implementation of the AoA has 
not been successful in bringing down the instability of international commodity prices. 
Moreover, a number of studies have also pointed out that import surges have increased in the 
post-Uruguay Round period and that in many cases these import surges have inflicted 
irreparable damage to domestic production and to the livelihood of farmers in developing 
countries. Under these circumstances, developing countries are justified in their demand for a 
temporary safeguard mechanism. 
 
To complicate the matter further, simulations show that the market access negotiations in 
agriculture will lead to significant cuts in tariff rates in most developing countries. As a result, 
the gap between the bound and applied tariff rates will come down considerably during the 
implementation of the Doha Round. A simulation analysis has been done in this paper using 
the G-20 tariff reduction formula and India’s tariff rates at the 6-digit HS level. The results 
show that for a number of important products the gap between bound and applied rates will 
either disappear or will become negligible. During the Uruguay Round the tariff overhang, 
allowed some degree of flexibility to developing countries to deal with contingencies 
associated with a sudden change in commodity prices. The Doha Round of tariff cuts will take 
away this flexibility from developing countries. Therefore, it is not surprising that many 
developing countries have argued that unless the WTO allows these countries to have access 
to SSMs it will be difficult for them to accept the tariff liberalization package of the Doha 
Round.  
 
So far the progress in the negotiations shows that the WTO recognizes these problems and has 
agreed to provide both price-based and volume-based SSMs to developing and least 
developed countries. However, the precise working mechanisms of these safeguards have not   45
been finalized and there are efforts from a handful of countries that are big exporters of 
agricultural commodities to restrict the usability of SSMs. These countries are apprehensive 
that widespread availability of SSMs may lead to increased protectionism. But this concern is 
not really justified. The implementation experience related to SSG has clearly shown that 
access to safeguard instruments did not necessarily translate into overuse or abuse of the 
system. Moreover, as per the Doha mandate, developing countries have a legitimate right to 
protect their domestic economy from the distortions that arise out of huge subsidization of the 
farm sector in developed countries. The SSM, along with the SPs, is going to be an important 
instrument for protecting the domestic production base, food security and livelihood security 
of farmers in developing countries. Imposing a priori and overly strict restrictions may 
hamper the usability of these instruments. Also, it is possible to develop in-built criteria for 
the implementation of SSMs so that its misuse can be minimized. This paper has outlined a 
possible method of doing so. It has been suggested in this paper that a built-in mechanism 
should be in place to ensure that countries are protecting their markets only from short-term 
fluctuations and not from secular price trends of agricultural commodities. Using these broad 
parameters, this study has proposed an alternate framework of SSM based on variable levy. It 
has been argued that in the absence of QRs, a variable-levy-based safeguard instrument can 
provide adequate protection against international commodity price volatility. 
 
However, mere availability of safeguard instruments may not be sufficient for ensuring 
protection from price volatility and import surges. Developing countries need to have a proper 
mechanism in place to take advantage of these instruments. There is a concern that the 
infrastructure in most developing countries may not be adequate to monitor the volume of 
imports in real time. Given this problem, these countries may face difficulties in monitoring 
imports and invoke volume-trigger-based safeguards. Similarly, the price-based instruments 
require constant monitoring of international prices. The administration of these safeguards 
also demands co-ordination between the agencies which handle the trade of the country and 
those which determine the tariff policies. Unless these conditions are fulfilled, developing 
countries will not be able to take advantage of these instruments even if the WTO allows 
liberal use of SSMs. It must also be remembered that, currently, a very large proportion of 
trade is routed through the RTAs and such trade does not come under the WTO rules. So the 
WTO safeguard mechanisms cannot be used to restrict imports coming through these routes. 
It has often been seen that countries take pains to secure safeguards in the multilateral forum 
and tend to overlook the possibility of import surges through the RTAs. Developing countries 
must recognize this issue and adopt more comprehensive policies to tackle import surges.     46
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   Pre WTO  Post WTO  Pre WTO  Post WTO 
Commodity Non-Fuel Price Index, 1995 = 100, includes Food and Beverages and 
Industrial Inputs Price Indices  10.22 13.50  8.36  12.27 
Commodity Food and Beverage Price Index, 1995 = 100, includes Food and 
Beverage Price Indices  9.69 12.33  5.39  10.49 
Commodity Food Price Index, 1995 = 100, includes Cereal, Vegetable Oils, Meat, 
Seafood, Sugar, Bananas, and Oranges Price Indices  9.74 12.08  5.99  10.30 
Commodity Beverage Price Index, 1995 = 100, includes Coffee, Tea, and Cocoa  26.82  23.07  17.06  15.06 
Bananas, Central American and Ecuador, FOB U.S. Ports, US$ per metric tonne  23.93  25.02  17.23  19.13 
Barley, Canadian no.1 Western Barley, spot price, US$ per metric tonne  18.25  15.86  14.70  12.64 
Beef, Australian and New Zealand 85 per cent lean fores, FOB U.S. import price, US 
cents per pound  8.61 15.23  6.59  7.58 
Cocoa beans, International Cocoa Organization cash price, CIF US and European 
ports, US$ per metric tonne  29.78 21.10 15.60  16.92 
Coffee, Other Mild Arabicas, International Coffee Organization New York cash 
price, ex-dock New York, US cents per pound  32.26 38.95 23.07  25.58 
Coffee, Robusta, International Coffee Organization New York cash price, ex-dock 
New York, US cents per pound  38.38 48.68 29.12  25.13 
Coconut Oil, Philippine, US$ per metric tonne  39.81  26.19  28.04  22.02 
Cotton, Cotton Outlook 'A Index', Middling 1-3/32 inch staple, CIF Liverpool, US 
cents per pound  18.89 24.97 15.40  14.63 
Groundnuts (peanuts), 40/50 (40 to 50 count per ounce), cif Argentina, US$ per 
metric tonne  36.88 10.35 24.21  8.23 
Hides, Heavy native steers, over 53 pounds, wholesale dealer's price, US cents per 
pound  28.83 13.53 15.20  7.56 
Lamb, frozen carcass Smithfield London, US cents per pound  15.56  15.75  12.96  10.90 
Maize (corn), U.S. No.2 Yellow, FOB Gulf of Mexico, U.S. price, US$ per metric 
tonne  17.50 22.24 12.38  13.80 
Olive Oil, extra virgin less than 1 per cent free fatty acid, ex-tanker price U.K., US$ 
per metric tonne  22.44 27.18 10.25  23.82 
Oranges, miscellaneous oranges French import price, US$ per metric tonne  20.47  32.57  15.61  19.32 
Palm oil, Malaysia Palm Oil Futures (first contract forward) 4-5 percent FFA, US$ 
per metric tonne  32.21 27.08 23.09  20.17 
Swine (pork), 51-52 per cent lean Hogs, U.S. price, US cents per pound.  32.17  26.78  21.46  21.18 
Poultry (chicken), Whole bird spot price, Georgia docks, US cents per pound  16.91  10.08  5.29  5.55 
Rice, 5 percent broken milled white rice, Thailand nominal price quote, US$ per 
metric tonne  27.67 22.87 18.74  17.69 
Rubber, No.1 Rubber Smoked Sheet, FOB Maylaysian/Singapore, US cents per 
pound  20.33 37.64 14.58  35.55 
Soybean Meal, Chicago Soybean Meal Futures (first contract forward) Minimum 48 
percent protein, US$ per metric tonne  17.08 22.52 12.68  17.99 
Soybean Oil, Chicago Soybean Oil Futures (first contract forward) exchange 
approved grades, US$ per metric tonne  19.86 20.27 16.21  16.87 
Soybeans, U.S. soybeans, Chicago Soybean futures contract (first contract forward) 
No. 2 yellow and par, US$ per metric tonne  15.60 21.11 11.58  16.91 
Sugar, European import price, CIF Europe, US cents per pound  20.89  9.38  10.11  8.11 
Sugar, U.S. import price, contract no.14 nearest futures position, US cents per pound  14.25  5.93  6.93  3.51 
Sunflower oil, Sunflower Oil, US export price from Gulf of Mexico, US$ per metric 
tonne  17.21 32.50 12.35  21.35 
Tea, Mombasa, Kenya, Auction Price, US cents per kilogram  23.72  16.46  14.37  13.62 
Wheat, No.1 Hard Red Winter, ordinary protein, FOB Gulf of Mexico, US$ per 
metric tonne  14.78 20.87 11.73  16.58 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the IMF.   49
 
Annex Table A 2. Tariff Cut Simulations of India: The Results  











090112  Coffee not roasted- Decaffeinated  150  100  90  -10 
090121  Coffee roasted –Not decaffeinated  150  100  90  -10 
090122 Coffee  roasted-  Decaffeinated  150  100  90  -10 
090210  Green tea (not  fermented) in  immediate packing 
of a content not  exceeding 3 kg  150 100  90  -10 
090220  Other green tea  (not fermented)  150  100  90  -10 
090230 
Black tea  (fermented) and partly fermented  tea, 
in immediate  packing of a  content not   
exceeding 3 kg" 
150 100  90  -10 
090240  Other black tea  (fermented) and other partly   
fermented tea  150 100  90  -10 
160100 
Sausages and  similar products,  of meat, meat 
offal or blood; food preparations based on these 
products" 
150 100  90  -10 
170111 Cane  sugar  150  100  90  -10 
170112 Beet  sugar  150  100  90  -10 
170191  Refined sugar containing added flavoring or   
coloring matter  150 100  90  -10 
170199 Other  sugar  150  100  90  -10 
220300  Beer made from malt  150  100  90  -10 
220410 Sparkling  wine  150  100  90  -10 
220421  Other wine In containers  holding 2L or less  150  100  90  -10 
220429 -Other    150  100  90  -10 
220430 -Other  grape  must  150  100  90  -10 
220510  Vermouth and other wine of fresh grapes In 
containers holding 2L or less  150 100  90  -10 
220590   Other  150  100  90  -10 
220600 
Other fermented   beverages (for example, cider, 
perry, mead);  mixture of fermented beverages   
and mixtures of fermented beverages and non-
alcoholic beverages not elsewhere specified or 
included" 
150 100  90  -10 
220710  Undenatured ethyl alcohol of an  alcoholic 
strength by volume of 80 per cent vol. or higher  150 150  90  -60 
220820  Spirits obtained by distilling grape wine or grape 
marc  150 150  90  -60 
220830 Whiskies  150  150  90  -60 
220840 Rum  and  taffia  150  150  90  -60 
220850 Gin  and  Geneva  150  150  90  -60 
220890 Other  alcohol  150  150  90  -60 
080290  Other betel nuts  100  100  65  -35 
080620 Grapes  dried  100  100  65  -35 
090111  Coffee not roasted -Not decaffeinated  100  100  65  -35 
090411  Pepper -Neither crushed nor ground  100  70  65  -5 
090700  Cloves (whole  fruit, cloves and  stems)"  100  70  65  -5 
090830 Cardamoms  100  70  65  -5 
100110 Durum  wheat  100  100  65  -35 
100190 Other,  excluding  spelt"  100  100  65  -35 
120300 Copra  100  70  65  -5 
120791 Poppy  seeds  100  70  65  -5 
151530  Castor oil and its fractions  100  100  65  -35 
151540  Tung oil and its  fractions  100  100  65  -35 
151560  Jojoba oil and its fractions  100  100  65  -35 
100610  Rice in the husk (paddy or rough)  80  80  56  -24 
100620  Husked (brown)  rice  80  80  56  -24   50











100640   Broken rice  80  80  56  -24 
100700 Grain  sorghum  80  80  56  -24 
151410 Crude  oil  75  75  52.5  -22.5 
151490 Other  crude  oil  75  75  52.5  -22.5 
100510 Maize  Seed  70  70  49  -21 
100630  Semi-milled or  wholly milled rice, whether or 
not polished or glazed"  70 70  49  -21 
210690  Other food preparations  60  150  42  -108 
040210 
Milk and cream In powder,  granules or other   
solid forms, of a  fat content, by weight, not   
exceeding 1.5 per cent" 
60 60  42  -18 
040221  Milk and cream In powder-Not containing  added 
sugar or other sweetening  matter  60 60  42  -18 
100590 Maize,  Other  60  60  42  -18 
080810 Apples  55  50  38.5  -11.5 
080820 Pears  and  quinces  55  35  38.5  3.5 
081320 Prunes  55  30  38.5  8.5 
160210 Homogenized    preparations  55  30  38.5  8.5 
160241  Hams and cuts  thereof  55  30  38.5  8.5 
160242  Shoulders and  cuts thereof  55  30  38.5  8.5 
190120  Mixes and doughs  for the preparation of bakers' 
wares of heading No1905  55 30  38.5  8.5 
190410  Prepared foods obtained by the swelling or   
roasting of cereals or cereal products  55 30  38.5  8.5 
190490  Other Prepared foods  55  30  38.5  8.5 
200310 Mushrooms  55  30  38.5  8.5 
200320 Truffles  55  30  38.5  8.5 
200410 Potatoes  55  30  38.5  8.5 
200490  Other vegetables and mixtures of vegetables  55  30  38.5  8.5 
200510 Homogenized    vegetables  55  30  38.5  8.5 
200520 Potatoes  55  30  38.5  8.5 
200540 Peas    55  30  38.5  8.5 
200551 Beans,  shelled"  55  30  38.5  8.5 
200559 Other  beans  55  30  38.5  8.5 
200560 Asparagus  55  30  38.5  8.5 
200570 Olives  55  30  38.5  8.5 
200580 Sweet  corn    55  30  38.5  8.5 
200590  Other vegetables and mixtures of vegetables  55  30  38.5  8.5 
210410  Soups and broths  and preparations  therefore  55  30  38.5  8.5 
190110  Preparations for  infant use, put up for retail sale"  50  50  35  -15 
150710  Crude oil, whether or not degummed"  45  45  31.5  -13.5 
150790  Other soybean oil  45  45  31.5  -13.5 
150910  Virgin olive oil  45  45  31.5  -13.5 
150990  Other olive oil  45  40  31.5  -8.5 
151000 
Other oils and their fractions, obtained solely 
from olives, whether or not refined, but not 
chemically  modified, including blends of these 
oils or fractions with oils or fractions  of heading 
No 1509 
45 45  31.5  -13.5 
040130  Of a fat content, by weight,  exceeding 6 per cent  40  30  28  -2 
040229 -Other  milk    40  30  28  -2 
040291  Not containing  added sugar or other sweetening  
matter  40 30  28  -2 
040299 -Other  40  30  28  -2 
040410  Whey, whether or  not concentrated or containing 
added  sugar or   other sweetening matter"  40 30  28  -2 
040610  Fresh cheese  (including whey cheese), not   
fermented, and curd"  40 30  28  -2   51











040620  Grated or powdered cheese, of all kinds"  40  30  28  -2 
040630  Processed cheese, not grated or  powdered"  40  30  28  -2 
040640 Blue-veined  cheese  40  30  28  -2 
040690 Other  cheese  40  40  28  -12 
350110 Casein  40  20  28  8 
080610 Fresh  grapes  40  40  28  -12 
020441 Carcasses  and  half-carcasses  35  30  24.5  -5.5 
071220 Onions  35  30  24.5  -5.5 
071230 Mushrooms  and  truffles  35  30  24.5  -5.5 
071290  Other vegetables; mixtures of  vegetables  35  30  24.5  -5.5 
090940 Seeds  of  caraway  35  30  24.5  -5.5 
091040  Thyme; bay leaves  35  30  24.5  -5.5 
110811 Wheat  starch  35  30  24.5  -5.5 
110813 Potato  starch  35  30  24.5  -5.5 
080940 Plums  and  sloes  30  25  7.5  -17.5 
410110 
Whole hides and  skins of bovine animals, of a  
weight per skin not exceeding 8 kg when simply 
dried, 10 kg when dry-salted, or 14 kg when 
fresh, wet-salted or otherwise preserved" 
25 0  6.25  6.25 
410130  Other hides and  skins of bovine animals, 
otherwise preserved"  25 0  6.25  6.25 
410140  Hides and skins of equine animals  25  0  6.25  6.25 
410210  Raw skins of sheep or lambs with wool on  25  0  6.25  6.25 
410221  Raw skins of sheep or lambs without  wool on  
(Pickled)  25 0  6.25  6.25 
410229  Raw skins of sheep or lambs without  wool on 
(Other)  25 0  6.25  6.25 
410310  Other raw hides or skins- of goats or kids  25  0  6.25  6.25 
410320 -Of  reptiles  25  0  6.25  6.25 
410390 -Other  25  0  6.25  6.25 
510111 Shorn  wool  25  15  6.25  -8.75 
510119 Greasy  wool,  Other  25  15  6.25  -8.75 
150200 
Fats of bovine animals, sheep or  goats, raw or  
rendered, whether  or not pressed or  solvent-
extracted 
15 15  3.75  -11.25 
060110  Bulbs, tubers,  tuberous roots, corms, crowns and  
rhizomes, dormant"  10 10  2.5  -7.5 
060120 
Bulbs, tubers,  tuberous roots, corms, crowns and  
rhizomes, in  growth or in flower; chicory plants 
and roots" 
10 10  2.5  -7.5 
060210  Unrooted cuttings and slips  10  10  2.5  -7.5 
060220  Edible fruit or  nut trees, shrubs  and bushes, 
grafted or not"  10 10  2.5  -7.5 
060230  Rhododendrons and azaleas, grafted or not"  10  10  2.5  -7.5 
060240  Roses, grafted or not"  10  10  2.5  -7.5 
120991 Vegetable  seeds  10  10  2.5  -7.5 
120999  Other seeds, fruits and spores  10  10  2.5  -7.5 
Notes: See notes to Figure 8.  52
Annex Table A 3. Some Simulations of the Proposed SSM Formula 
Scenario:  
a)  Suppose the long-term trend price of a commodity is 500 at time t. 
b)  We assume price trigger gets activated after 20 per cent drop of price from its long- 
term level. Therefore, the SSM is activated when international price is 400. 
c)  We suppose bound rate on the product is 50 per cent 
d)  Under this scenario, we calculate the maximum effective tariff our proposed model 
allows to a country for different level of price decline. The results are shown in the 




Price decline in  
per cent  Maximum Effective Tariff'  Maximum SSM Component 
400 20  87.5  37.5 
395 21  89.9  39.9 
390 22  92.3  42.3 
385 23  94.8  44.8 
380 24  97.4  47.4 
375 25  100.0  50.0 
370 26  102.7  52.7 
365 27  105.5  55.5 
360 28  108.3  58.3 
355 29  111.3  61.3 
350 30  114.3  64.3 
345 31  117.4  67.4 
340 32  120.6  70.6 
335 33  123.9  73.9 
330 34  127.3  77.3 
325 35  130.8  80.8 
320 36  134.4  84.4 
315 37  138.1  88.1 
310 38  141.9  91.9 
305 39  145.9  95.9 
300 40  150.0  100.0 
295 41  154.2  104.2 
290 42  158.6  108.6 
285 43  163.2  113.2 
280 44  167.9  117.9 
275 45  172.7  122.7 
270 46  177.8  127.8 
265 47  183.0  133.0 
260 48  188.5  138.5 
255 49  194.1  144.1 
250 50  200.0  150.0 
245 51  206.1  156.1 
240 52  212.5  162.5 
235 53  219.1  169.1 
230 54  226.1  176.1 
225 55  233.3  183.3 
220 56  240.9  190.9 
215 57  248.8  198.8 
210 58  257.1  207.1 
205 59  265.9  215.9 
200 60  275.0  225.0   53
International Price 
(P*) 
Price decline in  
per cent  Maximum Effective Tariff'  Maximum SSM Component 
195 61  284.6  234.6 
190 62  294.7  244.7 
185 63  305.4  255.4 
180 64  316.7  266.7 
175 65  328.6  278.6 
170 66  341.2  291.2 
165 67  354.5  304.5 
160 68  368.8  318.8 
155 69  383.9  333.9 
150 70  400.0  350.0 
145 71  417.2  367.2 
140 72  435.7  385.7 
135 73  455.6  405.6 
130 74  476.9  426.9 
125 75  500.0  450.0 
120 76  525.0  475.0 
115 77  552.2  502.2 
110 78  581.8  531.8 
105 79  614.3  564.3 
100 80  650.0  600.0 
 
Notes: See Section V for the definitions.   54
Annex Table A 1. Country Groupings in WTO  
African Group  
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Congo (Democratic Republic), Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, , Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
ASEAN  
Brunei, Cambodia (from October 2004), Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand 
Cairns Group  
Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada (G/AG/NG/W/11, 35, 93), Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, 
Uruguay 
G-10 
Bulgaria, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Republic of, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Norway, Switzerland, 
Chinese Taipei  
G-20 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Tanzania, Venezuela, Zimbabwe  
G-33  
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, China, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Rep. 
Korea, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, 
Philippines, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, 
Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe  
G-90 (African Union/Group, ACP, least-developed countries)  
Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cambodia. Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Fiji, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea (Conakry), Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, 
Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Suriname, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe  
Recent new members (RAMS or recently acceded members):  
Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Jordan, Moldova and Oman   55
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